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Abstract
Vehicle taxation based on CO2 emissions is increasingly being adopted worldwide in order
to shift consumer purchases to low-carbon cars, yet little is known about the eectiveness
and overall economic impact of these schemes. We focus on feebate schemes, which impose
a fee on high-carbon vehicles and give a rebate to purchasers of low-carbon automobiles. We
estimate a discrete choice model of demand for automobiles in Germany and simulate the
impact of alternative feebate schemes on emissions, consumer welfare, public revenues and
rm prots. The analysis shows that a well-designed scheme can lead to emission reductions
without reducing overall welfare.
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Transportation is globally the largest nal energy consuming sector. It is responsible for about
19% of worldwide energy consumption and 23% of energy-related CO2 emissions, and these
shares are projected to increase in the future. In the absence of serious technological progress
and policies to enable the adoption of low-carbon technologies, the sector's carbon emissions
are expected to rise by 50% in 2030 and over 80% in 2050, with almost all of this growth
coming from non-OECD countries (International Energy Agency, 2009). This comes in sharp
contrast to greenhouse gas mitigation achievements in other energy end-use sectors in which
energy eciency improvements and substitution with low-carbon fuels is less costly. However,
even with substantial greenhouse gas emission reductions in all other economic sectors, without
deep reductions in the emissions of the transport sector it is not possible to meet the emission
reduction objectives that are considered necessary in order to avoid serious climate change in
the 21st century.
The most widely discussed policy instruments for limiting automobile fuel consumption and
CO2 emissions are fuel economy standards, which aim to induce technological progress in vehicle
manufacturers, and fuel taxes, which intend to encourage consumers to purchase fuel ecient
cars (and to limit their use). A third policy option, which is receiving increased attention in
Europe and the United States, is the design of a motor vehicle taxation system that will change
relative prices, inducing consumers to purchase vehicles with low CO2 emissions. This may be
a promising policy option since it involves a market-based instrument that can aect consumer
behavior, in contrast to command-and-control regulations that may be economically inecient.
Consumers may adjust their behavior more easily than auto producers, as the latter have to
nd a dicult (and costly) compromise between regulatory mandates for high fuel economy and
consumer willingness to purchase bigger and more powerful (and hence less fuel ecient) cars.
If the tax levied per unit of carbon emitted is xed (i.e. if the tax is a linear function of a car's
carbon emissions) this equates marginal compliance costs across car models and automakers,
thus leading to an ecient outcome (Anderson, Parry, Sallee, and Fischer, forthcoming). In
countries that already have automobile taxes in place, the shift to CO2-based taxation can
be designed to be revenue-neutral by adjusting existing taxes and is therefore politically more
palatable than unpopular gasoline taxes.
Most European Union countries currently have in place a CO2-based component in their
calculation of vehicle taxes - either as a part of registration taxes (paid upon purchase) or of
circulation taxes (paid annually).1 Some countries have recently introduced feebate schemes,
1See European Automobile Manufacturers Association (2009) and OECD (2009) for overviews of the CO2-
1which pay a rebate to consumers purchasing a fuel-ecient vehicle and impose a penalty on
those purchasing gas-guzzlers. Despite the increased use of such schemes, there is little research
regarding their appropriate design and impact at the European level.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to this debate by analyzing the environmental and
economic eects from the hypothetical adoption of a feebate system in Germany. Germany is
an important country to study because it is the largest European economy and its regulatory
initiatives can have a wider impact across the continent. We specify a discrete-choice demand
and supply model for automobiles, estimate demand using a detailed dataset of car sales, and
use the results to simulate feebate policies of varying stringency. We compute the impact of the
various policies on consumer welfare, prots, public revenues, and CO2 emissions.
We specify demand with a two-level nested logit model that can produce quite rich substi-
tution patterns between automobile models belonging to dierent market segments. With the
aid of this model we experiment with dierent parameters of a potential feebate program. We
introduce a linear tax for new car purchases that is positive for cars with CO2 emissions over a
given emission level (the so called pivot point) and negative for cars with emissions lower than
this threshold. Then we explore trade-os between environmental eectiveness and economic
impact. Our analysis shows that it is possible to design a feebate system for new automobiles
that brings about carbon emission reductions without reducing total welfare; in fact it can also
increase welfare through the combined eect of improved public nances and lower environmen-
tal damage through reduced CO2 emissions, despite a decline in consumer surplus and rms'
prots. This is possible if one sets the pivot point at a level that is considerably lower than
the current average CO2 emission level of newly sold cars in a country, and ensures that the
marginal tax rate is not too high, i.e. corresponds to a price of less than 100 euros per tonne of
CO2.
Our work adds to only a handful of studies of the impact of carbon-based vehicle taxation.
Most work in the area has analyzed the US case (Fischer, 2008; Greene, Patterson, Singh, and Li,
2005). A small number of studies for Europe that have been carried out on behalf of the European
Commission, the EU's executive body, have dealt with this issue in an aggregate manner and
with simple statistical/econometric methods (European Commission, 2002a,b). Other studies
have made descriptive ex-post assessments of taxation schemes impemented in specic countries,
such as Rogan, Dennehy, Daly, Howley, and  O Gallach oir (2011) for Ireland or Bastard (2010)
for France. To our knowledge, ours is the rst study attempting an ex-ante econometric analysis
of the possible impact of CO2-based taxation schemes in a European country.
based taxation schemes implemented before the end of year 2009 by individual countries.
22 Existing literature
The feebate option currently implemented nationwide in Canada and France and to some extent
in other European countries2 has been a subject of debate in North America for several years
(Fischer, 2008; Greene, Patterson, Singh, and Li, 2005). Recently, Peters, Mueller, de Haan,
and Scholz (2008) have discussed issues regarding the design of a feebate system in Europe on
the basis of stated preference data from consumer surveys in Switzerland. Moreover, de Haan,
Mueller, and Scholz (2009) have applied an agent-based microsimulation model of car purchasing
consumer behavior that attempts to account for both direct monetary eects of such a system on
consumer behavior and indirect eects because of gradual changes in consumer preferences. In
a very recent development, Bunch, Greene, Lipman, Martin, and Shaheen (2011) have explored
the eectiveness of alternative feebate programs in California with the aid of a dynamic multi-
period optimization model that simulates automobile manufacturers' behavior and consumer
response. Liu, Cooke, Greene, and Bunch (2011) have extended this assessment by evaluating
the eectiveness of these programs if implemented across the whole United States.
Enviromental reforms of vehicle taxation schemes are often required to be revenue-neutral
in order to make them politically viable. Depending on vehicle tax systems currently in place
in each country, revenue neutrality can be achieved in two ways:
{ In countries with registration taxes on all new car purchases (such as numerous European
countries), registration taxes can be calculated on the basis of CO2 emissions in a way
that equates total revenues of the new tax scheme to that of the previous scheme. This
calculation would have to take into account the estimated shifts in market shares of car
models because of the response of consumers to tax incentives.
{ Countries without a registration tax (such as the United States, Japan, Canada as well
as the automobile producing countries in Europe) implement a feebate system in which
consumers receive a rebate when purchasing low-CO2 cars or incur an additional fee when
purchasing a high-CO2 car.3 If the system is properly designed, then total revenues from
fees may be approximately equal to governmental payments for rebates. In general, a
feebate system is almost equivalent to a fuel economy regulation with exibility mecha-
2See the review of Bunch, Greene, Lipman, Martin, and Shaheen (2011); countries such as Denmark, the
Netherlands and Norway have implemented some type of feebate program but have combined it with wider
reforms in their car registration tax systems.
3It is also possible to apply the feebate on the supply side, i.e. on automobile manufacturers or dealers. In
theory the eect would be the same regardless of where the tax is levied, in practice however it seems that price
incentives are more eective if levied at the consumer rather than the producer level (Sallee, 2010).
3nisms, i.e. allowing trading of fuel economy credits across vehicle types and manufacturers
(Fischer, 2008).
In our econometric analysis we specify and estimate a discrete choice model of demand for
dierentiated products. We chose to use the nested multinomial logit model (NML) as in Berry
(1994) and Verboven (1996) over the random coecients model developed by Berry, Levinsohn,
and Pakes (1995) (widely referred to as BLP). The random coecients model is more exible but
also more computationally demanding. Both models have been used widely to estimate demand
and market equilibrium in markets for dierentiated products, and particularly automobile
markets. We opted for the nested logit model because it is easier to estimate and it has been
successfully used in many applications. In order to allow for a more exible specication with
more consumer heterogeneity we specied two levels of nests, as in Verboven (1996).
The random coecients model was rst used to estimate the impact of policy and environ-
mental changes on market shares by the BLP authors in Pakes, Berry, and Levinsohn (1993).
Fershtman, Gandal, and Markovich (1999) estimated a nested logit model with a single nest
and simulated the impact of tax reform in the Israel automobile market. In a related applica-
tion, Vance and Mehlin (2009) examine whether tax incentives promote the purchase of more
ecient vehicles in Germany. They estimate a variant of the nested logit equation that departs
somewhat from the underlying utility framework. They nd that vehicle operating costs (such
as circulation fees and fuel taxes) enter signicantly in the purchase decision.
3 The model
3.1 The choice problem
There are J products to choose from. The utility of consumer i from consuming product j can
be written as
uij = j + ij; (1)
where j is the utility component common to all consumers (the mean utility) and ij is the
individual-specic component. The mean utility is specied as a function of price pj, a k-
dimensional vector of observed attributes of product j (such as horsepower, engine size, emission
levels, etc.) and an unobserved product attribute j. Mean utility is typically parameterized as
j = xj   pj + j: (2)
4The individual-specic component ij is assumed to follow a Type I extreme value distri-
bution, which yields convenient logit-style purchase probabilities. In the simple multinomial
logit the ij's are assumed to be independent and the market share equation reduces to the
familiar sj = ej=[1+
PJ
k=1 ek]. This functional form is known to be very restrictive. It implies,
for example, that all products with the same price and market share have the same own price
elasticities.
The NML model relaxes the independence assumption on the ij's by allowing for correla-
tion in individuals' preferences for products that are similar, in a sense to be specied by the
econometrician. This might seem arbitrary, but in practice one can often adopt already existing
conventions or industry classications. In the case of automobiles for example, dierent models
can be classied as compact, economy, midsize, luxury, SUV, MPV, estate, and so on. It is
reasonable to assume that products within each class have common characteristics that provide
a certain level of utility. One could use class-specic dummy variables to capture the mean
utility from each vehicle class. The NML specication provides an alternative approach that
allows the level of utility derived from each group to vary across individuals.4
Extending the idea to multiple levels of nests is straightforward (though the algebra can
get tedious). Groups of products can de divided into subgroups and preferences are allowed
to be correlated for products within each subgroup. Consider the two-level case. Let the J
products by divided into G+1 exhaustive and mutually exclusive groups indexed by g. Let each
g = 0;1;:::;G be further divided into Hg subgroups indexed by hg. The variance component
structure of the ij is dened as follows:
ij = 1
ig + (1   2)2
igh + (1   1)"ij: (3)
The term 1
ig represents the utility consumer i derives from consuming a product in group g
and 2
igh represents the utility from consuming a product in subgroup h of group g. The term
(1   1)"ij represents an idiosyncratic preference of consumer i for product j.5
From the utility framework described above one can derive the following equation to be taken
4Essentially, the NML model is equivalent to a specication with random coecients on group-specic dummy
variables (Berry, 1994).
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5to the data (see the appendix for details):
ln(sj)   ln(s0) = xj   pj + 1 ln(sj=h) + 2 ln(sh=g) + j: (4)
In the equation above, sj is the market share of product j (sales divided by M consumers);
s0 is the outside good share; ln(sj=h) is the share of product j in subgroup h and ln(sh=g) is the
share of all subgroup-h products in group g. McFadden (1978) has shown that the nested logit
model with two nests is consistent with random utility maximization if 0  2  1  1. If
both 1 and 2 are zero, an individual's preferences are uncorrelated across all available models,
and the model reduces to the simple multinomial logit model. If 1 is positive and 2 is zero,
preferences are correlated across cars from the same subgroup, resulting in localized competition
between cars from the same subgroup. If in addition 2 is positive, individual preferences are
also correlated across cars from dierent subgroups within the same group. If 2 approaches
1, preferences are equally correlated across all cars belonging to the same group, meaning that
the second grouping is not needed. If 1 approaches one, cars in the same subgroup become
perfect substitutes. If in addition 2 approaches one, all cars in the same group become perfect
substitutes.
Most papers employing the NML model to estimate demand for automobiles use vehicle class
(compact, midsize, etc.) as the main criterion for dividing products into groups. In addition, one
can specify additional groupings based on product characteristics that are critical in consumer
decisionmaking. One such characteristic is engine (and, by extension, fuel) type. Diesel engines
are widely used in Europe (unlike the United States) and the choice between a gasoline and
a diesel engine is one of the most important criteria in vehicle choice (Verboven, 2002). We
therefore allow for correlation across models using the same engine type.
3.2 The supply side
Multi-product rms are assumed to choose prices in order to maximize total prots from all
of their products. As in Verboven (1996), the rst order condition under the assumption of


















6The rst order condition implies that price net of VAT (v denotes the VAT rate) is equal
to marginal cost (mcj) plus a markup term. Parameters , 1 and 2 come from the demand
equation (4). The term sf=h =
P
f sjjh denotes the share of rm f's products within subgroup h;
sf=g =
P
f sj=g denotes the share of rm f's products within group g; and sf =
P
f sj represents
the share of rm f's products in the potential market.
One can proceed by estimating the demand equation (4) in isolation, or by estimating (4)
and (5) jointly.6 Joint estimation increases eciency at the cost of imposing the assumption of
Bertrand-Nash pricing. Since we have enough data, we opted for simplicity and fewer assump-
tions and estimated only the demand equation. Once we have the estimates of , 1 and 2, we
plug them into equation (5) in order to recover estimates of marginal cost for each product.
In order to obtain consistent estimates of the demand equation it is necessary to address
the endogeneity of prices and `within' shares. If rms observe unobserved quality j they will
take it into account when they set prices. This will induce a positive correlation between price
and the error term, leading to an upward bias (lower  in absolute terms) in the estimated
coecient in an OLS regression. The other endogenous variables are also positively correlated
with unobserved quality and the coecients 1 and 2 will also be biased upwards in the OLS
case. For this reason, general method of moments (GMM) or instrumental variable (IV) methods
should be used. Further details are provided in section 5.
4 Data
Data covering the period 2002-2008 were obtained from JATO Dynamics, a company specializing
in the collection of automotive data worldwide. For every type of car on the market in each year
we observe 17 attributes such as vehicle weight, engine size, sales volume and sales price. The
data are highly disaggregated; two model variants that dier in only one of the 17 attributes (e.g.
whether they have climate control or not) are recorded as dierent observations. As a result there
is a very large number of observations (157,047 in total), some of which correspond to a very small
number of units sold. Estimation of the model at this level of disaggregation is not advisable as
observations with very low sales are susceptible to measurement or recording errors. Typically
in studies of automobile markets the observation is at the level of the model (nameplate), e.g.
Ford Focus or Renault Scenic. We opted for a slightly smaller degre of aggregation by splitting
6The latter would require an assumption on the marginal cost function. Typically it is assumed that marginal
cost is constant in output and linear in product characteristics: mcj = wj +!j, where wj is a vector of product
characteristics that aect production costs and !j is an unobserved characteristics of product j.
7models into separate observations when there was substantial variation in engine size. The rule
was to split models based on 200cc increments (1100-1300cc, 1300-1500cc, etc.) In addition we
split models according to engine type (gasoline or diesel).7 Hence, an observation is dened by
model name, engine type and engine size (the latter in 200cc increments); for example \Ford
Focus, diesel, 1.9-2.1 liters".
The sales assigned to each observation are the total sales of all model variants corresponding
to the observation. Price and vehicle characteristics are from the best-selling variant. Observa-
tions with a sales volume of under 50 units in a year, or with a sales price of over e100,000 or
with engine capacity over 5 liters were removed from the dataset as they can be considered to
be market niches. Non-passenger cars such as pickups and large vans were also excluded. This
process led to a dataset of 5,982 observations in total. Some basic variables are described in
Table 1.
Table 1: Means of key variables (obs: 5,982)
Stats Eng. size CO2 emis. Power Frame Sales Prices
liters g/km HP m2 units 2005e
Min 0.6 81 41 3.79 51 6,745
5% 1.2 126 68 6.08 83 12,101
25% 1.6 157 102 7.13 320 17,850
50% 2.0 187 136 7.89 1,029 24,822
75% 2.4 227 177 8.55 3,377 35,100
95% 4.0 294 292 9.43 16,748 64,485
Max 5.0 440 530 10.18 115,451 101,312
Mean 2.14 196 149 7.80 3,667 29,025
Std dev. 0.81 53 69 1.02 7,616 16,009
Source: JATO Dynamics. Prices are deated (that is why the upper
bound of e100,000 is exceeded). Frame is length  width.
Each automobile model in our data is assigned to one of 24 market segments. This clas-
sication was too detailed for our purposes, so we aggregated up to seven broader segments
(small, medium, large, luxury, sport, MPV, SUV). Table 2 shows the average prices, sales, en-
gine capacity and CO2 emissions by vehicle class and engine type. As expected, larger cars have
higher CO2 emissions on average. In general, diesel cars have lower CO2 emissions compared to
their gasoline counterparts due to the higher fuel economy of diesel engines. This automobile
classication (two fuel types and seven segment classes for each fuel type) is the one we use in
7There are other engine/fuel types (electric, CNG, LPG, E85, hydrogen, methanol) but they only make up
0.8% of observations, so we removed them from the dataset.
8the demand estimation below. Note also that we have taken into account that the value added
tax rate in Germany (variable v in equation 5) was 16% until 31 December 2006 and increased
to 19% thereafter.
Table 2: Means of key variables by vehicle class
Class Obs. Eng. size CO2 emis. Sales Price
Gasoline engine
Small 659 1.33 149.07 6917 13.318
Medium 643 1.76 182.28 4741 19.948
Large 742 2.25 211.88 2520 29.456
Luxury 411 3.24 257.64 1183 53.416
SUV 425 2.86 267.02 977 37.004
Sport 401 2.64 230.03 1464 43.003
MPV 662 1.86 198.57 2657 22.693
Diesel engine
Small 273 1.46 121.90 2227 15.037
Medium 280 1.82 142.92 7140 21.373
Large 377 2.13 166.95 7223 29.373
Luxury 228 2.82 212.77 4799 50.032
SUV 321 2.66 243.83 2885 40.367
Sport 49 2.16 163.69 1211 35.245
MPV 511 1.94 171.64 3521 25.373
Source: JATO Dynamics.
The averages reported in Table 2 mask substantial variability in CO2 emissions of relatively
similar cars. Even within the same market segment, CO2 emissions vary by up to a factor of
two. This suggests that appropriate incentives such as vehicle taxation can induce consumers to
switch to a low-CO2 vehicle in their preferred segment without much utility loss. In the United
Kingdom it has been assessed that choosing the lowest CO2 emitters in any car market segment
can make a dierence of about 25% to fuel eciency and CO2 emissions (King, 2007).
5 Estimation
Extensive experimentation with dierent nesting structures led us to the choice of engine type
and market segment as the most appropriate classications for our data. We estimated the model
using each variable as the group variable and the other as the subgroup variable. Estimation
using market segment as the group and engine type as the subgroup produced the relationship
91 < 2, meaning that the particular nesting structure is not consistent with random-utility
maximization (McFadden, 1978). The reverse nesting structure (with engine type as the group
and market segment as the subgroup) produced 1 > 2, as required for consistency with
random-utility maximization. The results presented below use this structure.
Table 3: Estimates of demand equation
Variables 1-level NML 2-level NML
OLS IV OLS IV
Price -0.0052 -0.061 -0.0052 -0.059







Engine capacity -0.153 0.284 -0.153 0.273
(0.0063) (0.038) (0.0063) (0.038)
CO2 emissions 0.0022 -0.0012 0.0022 -0.0017
(0.000061) (0.00043) (0.000061) (0.00041)
Horsepower 0.0019 0.0060 0.0019 0.0056
(0.000070) (0.00060) (0.000070) (0.00058)
Frame -0.040 0.082 -0.040 0.087
(0.0022) (0.010) (0.0022) (0.011)
Manual gearbox -0.019 -0.270 -0.019 -0.244
(0.0055) (0.029) (0.0055) (0.028)
Climate control -0.0013 0.055 -0.0013 0.056
(0.0043) (0.020) (0.0043) (0.021)
Constant -3.018 -4.708 -3.019 -4.897
(0.018) (0.188) (0.018) (0.180)
F-test 35,675.25 763.35 34,395.89 706.98
Wald test, null: 1 = 2 0.09 32.91
Underidentication test 103.25 112.99
Overidentication test 3.48 3.51
Signicance levels: y : 10%,  : 5%,  : 1%. N = 5;982. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Time dummies are included but not reported for brevity. Country dummies are
reported in Table 5 in the appendix.
OLS and IV estimates for this nesting structure are presented in Table 3. In the same table
we also present estimation results for the one-level NML with engine type as the nest. A Wald
test rejects the null hypothesis 1 = 2, meaning that the two-level NML is the better model.
10The choice of instruments in this model specication was guided by the existing literature and by
the appropriate tests for instrument relevance and overidentication.8 From the set of potential
instruments, we choose to use the sum of CO2 emissions of other products sold by the same rm,
the sum of frame of other products sold by the same rm, the sum of frame of other products
sold by the same rm square, the number of other products in the subgroup and the number of
other products outside the subgroup but within the group. The Anderson canonical correlation
LM statistic - a test of the null hypothesis that the model is under-identied - was rejected.
The Sargan statistic - a test of the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid - cannot be
rejected.
In comparing OLS and IV estimates for both one-level and two-level NML models, recall that
the OLS estimate of the price coecient will be biased towards zero if the endogeneity problem
exists. This is because price is positively correlated with the error term, which represents
unobserved quality. This is clearly the case here: the coecient on price drops substantially
when we instrument for price. Similarly, the coecient on the other endogenous variables, the
within-shares, are positively correlated with unobserved quality and they also drop once we
instrument for them.
Estimates of the demand parameters , 1 and 2 are all consistent with the restrictions
of the nested logit model:  > 0 and 0  2  1  1. Engine capacity, horsepower, frame,
automatic transmission and climate control are important car attributes and have the expected
signs. CO2 emissions turned out to be negative and statistically signicant, implying that
consumers take emissions explicitly into consideration when deciding to purchase a car. On the
other hand, the small coecient (in absolute terms) indicates that emissions are less important
to consumers than other car attributes. We found the same result when we replaced the CO2
variable with a variable expressing fuel costs per kilometer. The signs on country dummies are
also what might be expected (e.g. German cars are highly regarded while Chinese cars are not).
The median own price elasticity corresponding to the , 1 and 2 coecients from the 2-level
NML IV regression is 6.001, similar to estimates from other automobile markets.
Public revenue (due to VAT receipts) from sales of the models included in our estimation
in the year 2008 was 11.1 billion euros (at 2005 prices) or 3,847 euros per car. Average CO2
emissions are 164 grams per kilometer per car. Manufacturer prots are estimated at 12.3 billion
euros and consumer welfare (without the constant C - see Appendix A.2) is 3.9 billion euros.
8See discussions in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and Bresnahan, Stern, and Trajtenberg (1997), among
others.
116 Policy simulations
Using the estimated model parameters, we can simulate the implementation of a feebate in
the German car market and assess the eects on automobile sales, prices, public revenues, rm
prots, consumer welfare and sales-weighted CO2 emissions. All results presented in this section
show the eect of taxation in the year 2008, the last year covered by our data. This provides a
reasonably good indication about eventual changes in car sales in the near future (e.g. in year
2011 or 2012)9. A simple way to proceed is to assume that the amount of the feebate will be
completely passed through to the nal price. That is, the nal price will change by the amount
of the feebate and the producer's price will remain the same. With this assumption, all one has
to do is to plug the new nal prices (old price plus feebate) into the demand system to compute
counterfactual shares and all other desired magnitudes.
This may provide a good rst approximation but a proper analysis should take into account
manufacturers' pricing responses. This requires solving for equilibrium prices in the hypothetical
scenario where a feebate scheme is introduced. The supply model outlined in section 3 produces
a set of pricing equations (one equation like (5) for each car model). Our counterfactual exercise
involves simulating the equilibrium in year 2008, in which there were 902 car models. We
therefore have a system of 902 nonlinear equations that need to be solved to produce the 902
prices. The technical details of how this was implemented are described in appendix A.3. One
point worth mentioning is that the results using optimal prices are very similar to those obtained
under the assumption of 100% feebate pass-through.
We assume that a feebate Aj is introduced. The VAT applied in Germany remains the same
as before. The feebate takes the form of a linear tax that is positive for cars with CO2 emissions
over a given emission level (the so called pivot point) and negative for cars with emissions lower
than this threshold:
Aj = t(CO2   PP);
where CO2 is the CO2 emissions level of model j and PP is the pivot point. Both CO2 and
PP are expressed in grams of CO2 per kilometer (g/km), t is the tax rate in euros per g/km
and Aj in euros per car of model j. It is possible to simulate programs with a nonlinear feebate
function, or with dierent functions for the `fee' and the `rebate' part, as implemented in some
countries so far (see e.g. Bunch, Greene, Lipman, Martin, and Shaheen (2011)); however we
9In fact, using data of more recent years 2009 and 2010 might have been misleading: automobile demand
and supply patterns may have been temporarily altered during those two years due to the implementation of
accelerated car scrappage schemes as part of scal stimulus measures.
12simulated a linear tax only because such a system imposes equal marginal abatement costs for
all manufacturers, thus leading to an economically ecient solution.
We carried out multiple simulations using dierent values of t and PP corresponding to
feebates of varying stringency, keeping in mind that public revenues should not decrease to an
unrealistically low level due to very generous rebates oered to low-carbon cars. More specically,
we conducted simulations with three dierent pivot points (160, 140 and 120 g/km) and four
dierent feebate levels (t taking values of 15, 30, 45 and 60). It is important to keep in mind the
correspondence between such a feebate system and an equivalent carbon tax. Assuming that a
car travels 200,000 kilometers throughout its lifetime, t = 15 corresponds to a tax of 75 euros per
tonne of CO2, while a feebate with t = 60 corresponds to a tax of 300 euros per tonne of CO2.
Although such values are higher than the usual value used to assess marginal CO2 damage costs
(approximately 15-30 euros per tonne CO2), it is still quite lower than the implied marginal
carbon tax rates of some CO2-based vehicle tax systems currently implemented in European
countries (Braathen, forthcoming).
We next present some results that show in detail the eects of dierent feebates by fuel, car
segment and CO2 emissions class, focusing on the case in which the pivot point is 140 g/km.
As will be shown in Figures 5 and 6 below, choosing such a pivot point can lead to signicant
environmental gains without strongly compromising other economic variables.
Figure 1 shows the change in automobile prices in dierent fuel/vehicle segment combinations
from the implementation of a lenient feebate (t = 15) and a stringent feebate (t = 60) respectively.
For simplicity we only report here segments small, medium and large, but eects are similar
in the other four segments (SUV, sports, luxury and MPV) as well. In the lenient feebate
case (upper part of Figure 1), price changes are relatively small, from -2.5% for small diesel
low-carbon cars up to 4% for medium gasoline high-carbon cars. Note that these values are
sales-weighted averages across specic emissions classes, which means that individual models
may experience higher or lower price changes depending on each model's CO2 emission levels.
In the stringent feebate case (lower part of Figure 1), average price changes range from -12% (for
small gasoline cars with low carbon emissions) to 17% (for the highest emissions class of medium
gasoline cars). Overall, the feebate is more favorable to most small cars and to medium-sized
diesel cars as will also be shown in Figure 4 below.
Changes in total automobile sales { compared to actual sales in Germany in year 2008 {
are displayed in Figure 2 for the two extreme feebate cases mentioned above. In each subgroup
belonging to a specic class, cars which belong to the lowest CO2 emission class (less than 130
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Figure 1: Simulated changes in prices in the German automobile market.
lowest CO2 emission class (130-160 g/km). Total sales of new cars (not shown on the graph),
which amounted to about 2.9 million cars in year 2008, decrease by 0.6% in the lenient feebate
case and by 4.2% in the stringent feebate case. This is the primary reason for reduced markups
and consumer welfare as will be demonstrated in Figures 5 and 6.
In order to provide more insight into shifts in the automobile market induced by the feebate
system, Figure 3 illustrates the simulated sales shares by emissions class, according to the four
dierent feebate levels described above, and compares them with the actual sales shares observed
in the German market in year 2008. Obviously, the more stringent the feebate the higher the
fraction of low- and medium-CO2 cars sold in the market. From 57% of actual total sales,
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Figure 2: Simulated changes in sales volumes in the German automobile market.
case, approaching 70% of total sales. Higher emitting vehicles are faced with a drop in their
sales; in the strong feebate case, the share of cars emitting over 200 g/km drops to less than
half, from 9.0% to 3.6%; and the share of cars emitting between 160 and 180 g/km falls from
10.6% to 7.1%.
The feebate leads to a shift towards sales of lower-carbon cars, and smaller sized cars. As
Figure 4 demonstrates, the sales fraction of the `small' segment rises from almost 25% (actual
sales in 2008) to over 31% (simulated sales with a strong feebate). As was shown in Figure 2,
small gasoline cars are the main winners because they exhibit the lowest average CO2 emission
levels. Although the share of medium-sized gasoline cars falls with increasing feebate stringency,
the corresponding fraction of medium-sized diesel cars rises considerably as there is a shift to
this segment primarily from larger diesel cars. The share of all larger cars (segments `large',
1514.6% 42.3% 23.5% 10.6% 9.0%
16.4% 43.9% 22.8% 9.7% 7.2%
18.3% 45.2% 21.9% 8.8% 5.7%
20.2% 46.3% 21.0% 8.0% 4.6%
22.3% 47.1% 19.9% 7.1%3.6%
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Figure 3: Actual and simulated sales shares in Germany by emissions category.
`SUV', `sports' and `luxury'), both gasoline and diesel powered, diminishes substantially because
of their higher than average CO2 emissions. Obviously this graph describes only average changes
in sales between segments, and does not display the shifts taking place within each segment,
from high-carbon to low-carbon cars, which also contribute to the simulated reductions in carbon
emissions.
When consumers purchase a more fuel ecient (and low-carbon) car it is possible that they
drive more with it because fuel costs are cheaper (the so called rebound eect) or that they drive
more with it and drive less with a second, less fuel ecient car that they own. Such an eect
might partly oset the environmental benet of a low-carbon car. However, in these calculations
we have implicitly assumed that each consumer chooses the mileage to drive with a car before
purchasing a specic car model, regardless of its size and the fuel it uses. Moreover, the rebound
eect has been found to diminish in recent years, at least in the US (Small and Van Dender,
2007).
Coming to the aggregate simulation results, Figure 5 illustrates the trade-o between envi-
ronmental eectiveness and three economic variables - public revenues, markups and consumer
welfare respectively. They display the results of simulations carried out with all three dierent
1624.9% 24.3% 19.0% 8.1% 15.3%
26.6% 24.8% 18.8% 7.1% 15.0%
28.2% 25.3% 18.5% 6.2% 14.7%
29.9% 25.7% 18.2% 5.5% 14.3%
31.5% 26.0% 17.9% 4.9% 14.0%
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Figure 4: Actual and simulated sales shares in Germany by fuel and engine size.
pivot points and four dierent feebate levels mentioned above.
The higher the tax rate t, the more stringent the system for high-carbon cars and the more
generous to low-carbon ones. Therefore, with higher values of t it is possible to attain higher
reductions of new car CO2 emissions through strong shifts in sales from high-carbon to low-
carbon cars. On the other hand, such a system substantially increases the price of most large
and medium-sized cars, thereby reducing automobile sales in general and leading to a drop
in both markups (due to lower demand) and consumer welfare (since some consumers avoid
purchasing a new car at these prices). Depending on the level of the pivot point, public revenues
sometimes decrease with increasing stringency of the feebate (as more rebates have to be paid
to buyers of low-carbon cars whose sales increase greatly) and sometimes increase (as the tax
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Figure 5: Eect of a feebate on public revenues, rm markups and consumer welfare for dierent
stringency levels and dierent pivot points. Changes are expressed in percentage terms compared
to the values of the corresponding variables according to actual sales in the German car market
in year 2008. The value of t increases as we move to the right of each graph, corresponding to
increasing stringency.
18If the pivot point is set at relatively high levels (e.g. 160 g/km) then the system is more
lenient towards high-carbon cars (their prices do not rise very much), and at the same time it
is more generous in rebates to low-carbon vehicles (as their emissions are much lower than the
pivot point). This combination keeps rm markups and consumer welfare unchanged or even
slightly higher than the no feebate case, but leads to a signicant decline in public revenues:
high-carbon cars do not pay a high fee while low-carbon cars receive substantial amounts in
rebates and therefore increase their sales. The environmental eectiveness of such a system is
limited due to the eects mentioned above. Using lower pivot points may keep public revenues
under control - and may even substantially increase them in the case of a low pivot point such as
120 g/km, but this comes at the detriment of rm and consumer surplus, which decline because
car sales drop. These simulations illustrate that it is possible to design a feebate system (for
example with a pivot point close to 140 g/km) that can be reasonably eective in terms of
reducing CO2 emissions of new cars without being particularly detrimental to other economic
variables.
To construct Figure 5, we have assumed that the environmental eect comes from both a
decrease in emissions per car and a decline in the total number of new cars sold. However,
in a country like Germany, with a nearly saturated car market, lower car sales do not lead
to a proportional reduction in emissions because most of the new cars sold are intended to
replace existing older vehicles. This means that if new sales are reduced this will largely cause a
higher use of existing cars, whereby the environmental benet is unclear (it mainly depends on
the emission levels of older cars that are not replaced by new ones due to the change in the tax
regime). Therefore, we show in Figure 6 an alternative indicator of environmental benet, where
the horizontal axis expresses the reduction in emissions per car, i.e. how much sales-weighted
average new-car emissions per kilometer have decreased compared to the actual values of year
2008. In most cases the CO2 eect is smaller when using the latter indicator because most
scenarios examined here lead to a decline in new car sales and hence not counting this decrease
as an environmental benet reduces the total eectiveness. In practice, the environmental eect
{ for each tax rate and pivot point { lies probably between the two dierent values shown in
Figures 5 and 6 respectively: some of the cars sold are not intended for replacing older ones,
hence a part of the drop in automobile sales will indeed decrease total CO2 emissions due to
lower automobile ownership in the country. For example, for a pivot point of 140 g/km (the
points indicated with squares in Figures 5 and 6), the environmental eect according to Figure
5 is 3.4% for the low tax rate and 11.2% for the high tax rate respectively, whereas it is 1.9%
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Figure 6: Eect a feebate on public revenues, rm markups and consumer welfare for dierent
stringency levels and dierent pivot points. The horizontal axis expresses the reduction in
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Figure 7: Total economic impact of each simulated feebate program, for two dierent values
for the social cost of carbon.
Figure 7 and Table 4 illustrate the overall economic impact of these policies by adding up
all four eects (on emissions, public nances, rm markups and consumer surplus) mentioned
above. Thus they display the change in total social welfare as a result of each feebate alter-
native. For this purpose it is necessary to express emission reductions in monetary terms, in
order to reect the increase in social welfare due to reduced environmental damage because of
reduced carbon emissions in each feebate scenario. Here we assumed that a car has a lifetime
of 200,000 kilometers and that its CO2 emission level remains constant (at the initial registered
21level) throughout its lifetime. Reduced environmental damage comes from lower average carbon
emissions per car and in some cases also from reduced new car sales. However, as explained
earlier in this section, the fact that fewer cars may be sold under a feebate program than with-
out the program does not lead to a proportional environmental benet since many of those cars
would replace older ones. Hence in order to estimate the net environmental benet realistically
it is necessary to account only for those cars which would enter the market without replacing
other ones. Comparing the German statistics of total car stock with those of new automobile
registrations in the 2000s we found that the annual increase in the stock represents only 4-7% of
new registrations (European Commission, 2010). We therefore assumed that if a feebate scenario
leads to reduced car sales, only 6% of these sales will indeed cause an environmental benet and
thus increase social welfare. Finally, in line with the central estimates provided by expert groups
for policy makers (Aldy, Krupnick, Newell, Parry, and Pizer, 2010; Interagency Working Group
on Social Cost of Carbon, 2010), we assumed a social cost of carbon (SCC) equal to 15 euros (at
2005 prices) per tonne of CO2
10. According to a standard denition, the SCC is an estimate of
the monetized damages associated with an incremental increase in carbon emissions in a given
year, to account for adverse economic impacts of climate change to agricultural productivity,
human health, natural disasters etc. (Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon,
2010). For sensitivity analysis we also calculated total welfare changes assuming a higher SCC
value equal to 30 euros/tonne.
As Figure 7 shows, a feebate can increase social welfare if the program's threshold (pivot
point) is set at relatively low levels, e.g. at 120 g/km, regardless of program stringency. At
moderate pivot point such as 140 g/km the eect may be marginally positive or negative for
welfare. For reasons explained earlier in this section, setting the pivot point at higher levels
will generate more costs than benets; and high stringency levels (i.e. high values of t) do not
make much economic sense since they imply a very high carbon tax. Assumptions regarding
the social cost of carbon have a negligible eect on the whole result. This is because the overall
environmental benet is quite low because of the modest amount of carbon emissions saved
per car and because the feebate applies to new cars only, thus leaving the rest of the car stock
unaected.
These welfare changes are expressed in absolute terms in Table 4. Overall, economic impacts
- depending on feebate settings and carbon values - range from -2.5 to +1.3 billion euros at 2005
prices; with a total national GDP of about 2.5 trillion 2005e (European Commission, 2010),
10This value corresponds to the value of 21 US dollars at 2007 prices per tonne of CO2 suggested by Interagency
Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon (2010), deated to prices of year 2005 that we use throughout the paper,
and assuming an exchange rate of 1.4 US dollars per Euro.
22Table 4: Total economic impact of each simulated feebate program, for two dierent values for
the social cost of carbon (SCC), in million euros at 2005 prices
SCC=15 euros/tonne CO2 Pivot Point
t 160 g/km 140 g/km 120 g/km
15 -397.4 94.1 562.4
30 -954.3 29.3 921.7
45 -1654.2 -165.7 1120.6
60 -2489.2 -471.9 1188.4
SCC=30 euros/tonne CO2 Pivot Point
t 160 g/km 140 g/km 120 g/km
15 -371.1 120.4 588.8
30 -904.3 79.2 971.7
45 -1582.9 -94.3 1192.0
60 -2398.2 -380.8 1279.4
these welfare eects range from -0.10% to +0.05% of the German GDP.
It has to be noted that, since our model is static, these calculations may not be able to
capture the full long-run eects of a feebate policy because they do not take into account future
changes on the supply side, i.e. the response of auto manufacturers who may proceed with
investments in new technologies in order to produce more low-carbon cars in the longer term.
Notwithstanding this caveat, it is reasonable to state that a feebate program, although having
a small immediate impact because it addresses only new cars sold in the market, can provide a
long-term signal to both auto manufacturers and consumers and hence can induce technological
progress in the auto industry. This signal will be even stronger if the system's pivot point
decreases over the years, which is equivalent to an increasingly more stringent CO2 standard
and provides incentives for continuous technological improvements.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper has described a model of oligopolistic competition in markets with dierentiated
products, simulating demand and supply under alternative tax regimes in the car market. The
model can be applied using detailed sets of car data that are typically available (though not
freely) for OECD countries. We have shown through empirical estimations that the model is
an improvement over the standard nested logit model that is widely used in the literature,
thereby enabling the estimation of richer demand patterns without imposing a high computa-
23tional burden. The objective is to perform simulations in order to evaluate policies that could
shift consumer purchases towards low-CO2 cars and thus lead to the reduction of fuel use and
CO2 emissions. Using a detailed dataset for the period 2002-2008, we have presented results
from the econometric analysis and policy simulations for the car market of Germany. We found
automobile fuel cost and CO2 emissions to be almost insignicant for consumers when they
determine to purchase a new car; this lends support to the statement of Greene (2010) that
consumers substantially undervalue fuel economy relative to its expected present value.
We simulated the eect from the implementation of feebates on newly purchased cars, which
impose an additional fee to be paid by high-carbon vehicles and a rebate to be given to purchases
of low-carbon automobiles. A linear tax was introduced in such a way that it is positive for cars
with CO2 emissions over a given emission level (the so called pivot point) and negative for cars
with emissions lower than this threshold.
It turns out that, if the pivot point is set at high levels (approaching the current sales-
weighted new-car average CO2 emissions in the country), then it is much more dicult to
reduce CO2 emissions even if the tax rate is very high. A high pivot point may increase car
sales (and hence rm prots and consumer welfare) but leads to a signicant loss of public
revenues. On the other hand, a pivot point set at low levels may increase public revenues and
reduce CO2 emissions eectively at the cost of a large decline in total car sales, leading to a
substantial drop of markups and welfare. It is essential for policy makers to choose wisely the
pivot point and the linear tax rate in a way that they weigh precisely both costs and benets.
Our analysis for Germany has shown that it is possible to design a feebate program for new
automobiles that brings about carbon emission reductions without reducing total welfare; in
fact it can also increase welfare through the combined eect of improved public nances and
lower environmental damage through reduced CO2 emissions.
This analysis has important policy implications. At a time when national governments
increasingly adopt a CO2-based element in the calculation of their vehicle taxes, the model
described in this paper constitutes a tool for the evaluation of real-world policy options. This is
particularly important as current car taxation policies seem to have been designed in many cases
without a sound analysis of consumer response to these policies. As a result, the eect on public
revenues is often assessed by governments in a very rough manner, which may lead to signicant
errors. If consumer response is overestimated then a specic policy does not have the eect it
was initially assumed to have; on the other hand, if consumer response is underestimated then
the policy may prove to be more successful than initially thought, which in turn may lead to a
signicant loss of public revenues - this was indeed so in at least three cases we are aware of: the
CO2 rebate system in the Netherlands in year 2002, the French feebate system (`bonus-malus')
24that was launched in 2008 (Bastard, 2010) and a CO2-based car taxation scheme introduced in
Ireland in 2008 (Rogan, Dennehy, Daly, Howley, and  O Gallach oir, 2011).
Results of this study can also have important implications for EU-wide policies towards vehi-
cle taxation. Although taxation generally remains under the competence of national authorities,
attempts to harmonize vehicle taxes at EU level are under way. Some years ago, the European
Commission issued a proposal for a law (Directive) that would, inter alia, oblige EU Member
States to change their taxation schemes so that at least half of the total revenues from vehi-
cle taxation came from CO2-based taxes (European Commission, 2005). Virtually no progress
has been made on this proposal, primarily because of issues of national sovereignty in taxation
matters. However, in an ever more carbon-constrained world, these topics are always open for
discussion and economic research has an important role to play.
The analysis can be enriched in several ways, such as estimating a richer demand model or
experimenting with additional taxation schemes. Perhaps the greatest challenge in this literature
is in the modeling of the dynamic adjustment of auto manufacturers to gradual changes in
consumer preferences due to increasingly stringent environmental taxation. Nonetheless, even
this static framework can be a quite useful tool for analyzing carbon-based tax policy options
and contributing towards a more eective and ecient low-carbon transportation policy.
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A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of the demand equation for the two-level nested logit
Here we derive the demand equation for the nested logit with two nests. Following Verboven
(1996), the specic functional form of the share for a car j, belonging to a subgroup h of group












































































































































































We can now derive a simple analytic expression for mean utility levels that depend on the
unknown values of Dh and Dg. Taking logs of market shares,






ln(Dh)   2 ln(Dg): (7)
Next we need to nd analytic expressions for Dh and Dg as functions of sj;s0;sjjh and shjg.








. So sg = D1 2
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ln(sj)   ln(s0)   ln(sjjh)   ln(shjg)
1   2
: (8)





Dh . By taking logs, the following





Substituting equations (9) and (8) into equation (7) concludes to the demand equation for
nested logit with two nests as follows:
29ln(sj)   ln(s0) = j + 1 ln(sjjh) + 2 ln(shjg);
where j = xj   Pj + j.
A.2 Public revenues, environmental eects, rm prots and welfare
Using the estimates ^ , ^  ,^ , ^ 1 and ^ 2, we can compute the share of the outside good, rm
prots (from the markup term), and public revenues. Public revenues from product j are
vPj
1+v,
and rm prots from product j are given by the markup term in equation (5). We multiply
both with sales volume (shares*M) to obtain the sum per market and year. The environmental
eect is the sum of CO2 emissions; we multiply CO2 emissions with sales volume and then sum
them up for each market and year.
Our measure of consumer welfare is obtained by integrating over the demand system, which



































where C is the constant of integration and can be ignored because only the change in welfare
(Wsimul   Wactual) is of interest.
A.3 Simulation details
We need to solve a system of 902 nonlinear equations of the form (5). Matlab's built-in non-
linear equation solver failed to produce a solution. To circumvent this problem we resorted to
contraction mapping techniques. Consider a slightly simplied form of equation (5) in vector
form:
P = MC + MU(P): (10)
The vector of prices P is equal to marginal cost MC plus a markup term MU, which is itself
a function of P. We know MC and the functional form MU(P) and we are interested in the
30unique vector P that solves (10). Dene T as the mapping:
T[P] = MC + MU(P): (11)
Suppose we start from an initial vector of prices P0 and repeatedly apply T:
Pn = MC + MU(Pn 1) (12)
Then, if T is a contraction mapping with modulus less than one (more on that below), limn!1Pn =
P. In other words, starting from P0 and repeatedly applying T will converge to the unique
solution P.
We conjectured that T is indeed a contraction and applied this procedure to our problem.
The method converged to a solution in both the 1-level and the 2-level nested logit. Verifying
that the convergence point is a solution to (10) is straightforward; one just has to plug it into
(10) and verify that the equation holds. Showing that the solution is unique is more dicult.
Ideally one would like to establish uniqueness by showing that T is a contraction mapping with
modulus less than one. A contraction mapping, or contraction, on a metric space (M;d) is a
function T, with the property that there is some nonnegative real number k 2 (0;1) such that
for all P in M, d(T(P);T2(P))  kd(P;T(P)).
Unfortunately we were not able to show that T is a contraction. In order to ensure that our
solution was unique we experimented with dierent starting points P0. The procedure converged
to the same solution no matter where we started from, even from out-of-the-way points such as
identical prices. This does not constitute formal proof that the solution is unique, yet it is hard
to see what another possible solution could lie. We therefore use the solution obtained from this
method to conduct the analysis in section 6.
31A.4 Additional estimates
Table 5: Estimates of country dummies in demand equation
Variables 1-level NML 2-levels NML
OLS IV OLS IV
China 0.029 -0.686 0.028 -0.876
(0.089) (0.334) (0.089) (0.341)
Czech Rep. 0.014 0.030 0.014 0.058
(0.012) (0.045) (0.012) (0.046)
England 0.011 0.042 0.011 0.056
(0.0067) (0.026) (0.0068) (0.027)
France -0.0082 -0.066 -0.0081 -0.050y
(0.0058) (0.024) (0.0058) (0.026)
Germany 0.013 0.379 0.013 0.387
(0.0054) (0.031) (0.0054) (0.031)
Italy -0.047 -0.178 -0.047 -0.178
(0.0075) (0.039) (0.0075) (0.040)
Korea -0.023 -0.352 -0.023 -0.343
(0.0077) (0.033) (0.0077) (0.034)
Romania 0.034 -0.161 0.034 -0.109
(0.035) (0.134) (0.035) (0.136)
Russia -0.054y -0.654 -0.054y -0.665
(0.029) (0.112) (0.029) (0.114)
Spain -0.024 -0.215 -0.024 -0.194
(0.010) (0.041) (0.010) (0.042)
Sweden -0.0087 -0.037 -0.0088 -0.054
(0.0087) (0.041) (0.0087) (0.041)
Switzerland 0.017 -0.356 0.017 -0.320
(0.015) (0.057) (0.015) (0.059)
USA -0.077 -0.461 -0.077 -0.490
(0.015) (0.057) (0.015) (0.060)
Signicance levels: y : 10%,  : 5%,  : 1%. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. Variables shown here denote the country of
origin of each car model. See further explanations in table 3.
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